

PHILOSOPHY,  
RELIGION AND  
EDUCATION

# Christianity and Crisis

A Bi-Weekly Journal of Christian Opinion

VOL. XII, No. 6

APRIL 14, 1952

\$2.00 per year; 10 cents per copy

## "Neither Cold Nor Hot"

"I KNOW thy works, that thou art neither cold nor hot: I would thou wert cold or hot." So spoke the Spirit to the Laodicean church. An odd thing to say, surely. Would that you were either better or worse! Yet there is a terrible logic in it. The saints walk with God. Sinners may repent and be redeemed. But what can be done for those in whom no fire burns, who lives at peace with the secular world, whose religion leaves them quite cool and comfortable? Having no glaring sins to repent of, feeling no disturbing urge to newness of life, they are able to enjoy their conventional righteousness.

What may we suppose the Spirit is trying to communicate to the American churches? The same word, perhaps, that was spoken to the Laodiceans: "Neither cold nor hot." When we look at the most recent figures of church membership in this country a troublesome thought is likely to intrude itself. The same newspapers that feature this evidence of the growth of organized religion carry shocking accounts of corruption in public and private affairs, of political ruthlessness in both major parties, and of bitter economic and industrial conflict that threatens the national well-being. And as for the Christian missionary spirit that religious leaders have sought to infuse into the conduct of foreign affairs, it seems to be dormant, so far as the center of political power in Congress is concerned. As the Christians increase in numbers, one is tempted to comment, the nation becomes less Christian. Surely the Spirit—the Grand Inquisitor of the Book of Revelation—would ask sharp questions about this.

Let it be granted freely that much of the current distress over moral decline is less than wholly valid, and even not wholly genuine. There seems to be an inveterate human tendency to deplore the evils of the present in the light of an imaginatively reconstructed past. No one has brought forth proof that the disposition of people, in the aggregate, to choose good instead of evil is less strong than it used to be. There is no immediate occasion to page Noah and

prepare for another Flood. Moreover, it is quite patent that not a little of the current lamentation over the state of public morals is political "rejoicing in iniquity"—the iniquity of the opposing party.

But when all this has been duly taken account of, some stubborn facts remain. The evidences of "materialism" in the grosser meaning of that word, of sheer pleasure seeking, of preoccupation with individual private gain, of reckless disregard for the rights and reputations of others, of a pusillanimous conception of Americanism, of lack of ordinary charity among religious groups—all this is sadly incongruous with the statistical picture of a nation that is becoming more religious.

The disturbing question intrudes itself whether church membership has lost so much of its original significance that it has decreasing importance as an evidence of ethical awareness and sensitivity. It can hardly be questioned that, by and large, membership in a church does signify a genuine *religious* concern, a sense of incompleteness, and of need for worship. But in *ethical* terms the question is what relevance this religious mood has to the business of daily living. All too commonly, when they confront moral choices in their daily working life and in the activities of citizenship, Christians are "neither cold nor hot." Indeed, they behave very much like all the rest of the community: that it is to say, they are secularized.

This is the basic concern of the movement for recovery of the sense of "Christian vocation." It accounts for the dynamic behind the recent conference in Buffalo on "The Christian and His Daily Work." When the Christian gospel loses its quality of searching, disturbing criticism of accepted ways of living, it is nothing but the ashes of a fire that has burned out.

Herein lies the tragedy of the church as it stands rooted in the world—the existential church. The more inclusive it becomes the more hostages it gives to a secular order with which its gospel is never at

peace. Our great churches are, in the nature of the case, worship centers for a multitude of men and women whose devotion to Christianity as a remote, eschatological goal is not to be doubted, but who are far from accepting it as a discipline of life. This is, of course, the reason why the small sects which insist on an ethical discipline persist alongside the great denominational churches. Their slogan is "Come ye out . . . and be ye separate." The slogan of the church as a whole is, "Whosoever will may come." It conceives its mission as a ministry to all who will set foot upon its doorstep—all who have heard ever so faintly the call of God. For men feel the need for worship long before they feel the full impact of the Ten Commandments.

The very universality of Christianity creates a definite bias toward inclusiveness as a criterion of the true Church. Saint Paul seems to have been much concerned over the problem of the role of discipline within a fellowship of love. He had a strong urge to purge the young churches he watched over of those who rejected Christian self-discipline and chose to conform to secular moral standards. "If I come again," he once warned, "I will not spare." Yet he apparently depended more on appeal than on chastisement. And this was in the early sectarian period of

Christian history. It was inevitable that as the Christian community grew the contrast between its group ethic and that of the secular community would be less marked. In the transition from smallness to greatness the heat of the crusading sect radiates away, and the mass remains "neither cold nor hot."

This simple but stubborn fact is highly relevant to the current consolidation of Protestant strength in one great organization, the National Council of Churches. It is idle to suppose that so inclusive and representative an agency will retain the crusading zeal of some of the smaller ones it absorbed. Large bodies move slowly. It may even be contended that some of our church agencies have been more "splendidly isolated" in their prophesying than truly representative in a democratic sense.

The crucial questions, one may suggest, are these: Are the churches and their delegated agencies moving forward in an effort to make Christianity regnant in human lives and in human affairs? Are they deliberately fostering ethical concern, searching analysis, self-criticism? And are they ready to follow faithfully the democratic process, eschewing the crude methods of secular politics, and subordinating group interest to a common will that is informed with the Spirit of Christ?—F.E.J.

## America and the Commonwealth: A Mid-Century Survey

LIONEL GELBER

FROM their enemies Americans do not expect bouquets. For the brickbats of friends they are ill-prepared. Mr. Lester Pearson declares that the period of easy and automatic relations between Canada and the United States has come to an end. In the United Kingdom the Third Force illusions fostered by Mr. Aneurin Bevan could detract from that Anglo-American solidarity which saved Britain in two world wars and would be her mainstay in a third. This, however, no one knows better than the new Prime Minister; in laying fresh emphasis upon it Mr. Churchill will have the support of other English-speaking members of the Commonwealth. Their strategic ties are closer now with the United States than with Britain herself.

For them, at any rate, Anglo-American unity thus becomes the condition of Commonwealth unity. As long as it continues, no awkward choices will have to be made. But its effect on inner Commonwealth

affairs has been profound. Britain, moreover, still retains many of her own particular colonial dependencies: the British Empire, as such, still goes on, and quite separately, under her wing. The Iranian and Egyptian imbroglios demonstrate how much of her power in world politics is derived from that old imperial position. And so far as the strength of Britain overseas underpins the structure of the West, the United States cannot welcome its demise. Rivals for trade and influence, brothers-in-arms simultaneously—the paradox of their friendship is, after all, no greater than that which the Commonwealth itself exhibits. Warmakers in 1914 and 1939 anticipated that its units would break irretrievably away. When they did not do so, Britain, despite huge material losses, could be credited with compensating moral gains. In the two world wars of the century such moral elements had tangible consequences. Their role has not ceased.

The withdrawal from the Commonwealth of Ireland and Burma is, then, less significant, than the reluctance of more important countries to secede. Not that its independent cooperating units see eye to eye on major questions. Differences in aspiration and culture would have bisected the persisting Commonwealth into two wings, an Asian and an Atlantic-Pacific, even if there had been no Korean war to accelerate this tendency. The salient fact is, however, not the grouping and re-grouping which goes on within it but that it somehow still manages to survive as a single entity. The Union of South Africa is on bad terms both with Britain and the Asian wing of the Commonwealth; constitutionally India acknowledges no allegiance to the Queen—though it recognizes her as Head of the larger Commonwealth association. After World War II Americans sympathized with Asian nationalism. The British, relying on the United States to repair the dollar-sterling gap, might canalize that which they could no longer contain. East-West antagonism helped slow up the trend towards Commonwealth disintegration. But under the impact of the Korean war one further brake upon that trend has been the rejection of American leadership by its Asian wing.

To keep it in touch with the West and to keep the West in touch with it, the dual Commonwealth, divided and yet undissolved, has a coordinating function to perform. And that should be recalled in an hour when Arab revolt is shaking its connecting links in the Middle East and the allied power of France in North Africa. Defense and preferential trade are concrete grounds upon which Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand have maintained a positive unity; a common history and a common mode of government are no less potent. From the imponderables of that tradition India, Pakistan and Ceylon will be more aloof. But, having shed their subordinate rank, they are willing to share with Occidental partners whatever advantages the Commonwealth provides. Among these neither geographic, racial nor social coherence will be visible; out of an evolving past it substitutes for them a momentum, at once palpable and indefinable, of its own. Towards the Commonwealth its Asian members may, like the Union of South Africa, be more negative in attitude. By participating freely within it they attest to its worth.

And it is here that the Anglo-American factor comes into play. For through this, the entire Commonwealth has special access to Washington and Washington has special access to it. A mixture of national interest and historic imponderables bind together the Atlantic-Pacific wing of the Commonwealth; so also does one between it and the United States. Nowadays it is taken for granted that, in

supreme crisis, the English-speaking peoples will stick together; such, in combination with France, is the tacit core of the Atlantic Alliance. Within the framework of that ultimate assumption there has, however, been a shift. Until Pearl Harbor it was the task of Britain and Canada to ensure that, in the defense of our free world order, the United States would act in time. Today the boot is on the other foot. The problem of American-Commonwealth relations is not one of American insularity but the outward thrust of American global initiative—the quarters to which it is directed, the pace at which it is set, the interests of allies and friends upon which it impinges.

Power may seem more imperious than it means to be. When aggression in Korea first occurred, the Atlantic-Pacific wing of the Commonwealth was less out of step with the United States than its Asian wing. But both sections tended to converge as fear grew that the war might be widened through the later strategy and pronouncements of General MacArthur, the insistence of Washington upon sanctions against Communist China, the failure of American domestic policies to halt at the water's edge. Deeper resentments were also at work. These hitherto had been nourished by Asian members of the Commonwealth against Britain herself. With her retirement from the Indian sub-continent, however, British imperialism alone could no longer be blamed for all its troubles. Asian countries, discovering that liberty might but replace one ill by a new, turn to the American archetype of Western power upon which also to vent their spleen.

This phenomenon, as the sceptre changed hands elsewhere, is one that is not without its European parallels. Gandhi left a gospel of love; with the departure of the British it is a vacuum of hate which many of his heirs have filled. Obsessed by past wrongs rather than current hazards, they are apt to minimize the Sino-Soviet threat. To raise their standard of living non-Soviet peoples of Asia have sought the bounty of the West—North American wheat, Point Four aid, the Colombo plan of the Commonwealth, technical assistance from the United Nations. Communist China may sell India food; Soviet Russia has little to offer—and for that the price is national independence itself. Colonially, as she expands, the West contracts; yet it is the economic imperialism of the West that is derided. In fact the American - Commonwealth relationship furnishes Asian members of the Commonwealth with a vital, if unadmitted, reassurance. They can toy with concepts of a Third Force because their brand of detachment from the West permits them to reap the benefits of collaboration while remaining uncommitted.

Nor for Britain herself are Commonwealth difficulties what they once were. The demands of Asian nationalism have been realized to a point which enables the two wings of the dual partnership to work together. But as these demands are impelled by an ideology whose scope is general as well as local, their extension might further sap Britain's imperial power elsewhere. That their strict fulfillment would imperil free Asia itself is, however, a view which carries more weight in London than in New Delhi, Karachi or Colombo. Like India, Pakistan and Ceylon, the United Kingdom may have recognized Mao Tse-tung and been resigned to the entry of his regime into the United Nations; if he had not plunged into his Korean adventure, Canada, Australia and New Zealand would probably have followed suit. Yet Britain herself is still seated at Hong Kong; she took the Dutch side over Indonesia; French resistance in Indo-China is what protects Malaya. In Malaya, moreover, complete autonomy under majority rule would entail the ascendancy of Chinese settlers rather than that of the native Malayans themselves. Justice for Asians and the total eviction of the West from the Orient are, in other words, not always the same.

But the Asian wing of the Commonwealth has its own grave household rifts and should war wrack the Indian sub-continent matters such as these would be eclipsed. Attempting to redress the balance against her bigger Commonwealth adversary, Pakistan accepts the Crown and leans more towards London; one Asian nationalism in a clash with another thus looks to a non-Asian counterpoise. Pakistan complains, nevertheless, that over Kashmir the West has handled India rather than herself with kid gloves. And it is evident that as long as these two neighbors are mobilized against each other, economic succour from the United States and any of their fellow-members of the Commonwealth cannot serve its purpose; the West, whose power politics Asian countries are prone to denounce, thereby provides an indirect subsidy for such a contest within the Indian sub-continent itself. Under the circumstances, however, Pakistan's pan-Islamic affinities may be soft-pedalled. Theoretically, she will back Iranian and Arabic intransigence against Britain; by unilateral Egyptian control at Suez she might be cut off from the West. And this would not only leave her at the mercy of India; over the Khyber Pass other shadows loom. Mr. Nehru's proposal that Egypt play a large part in an "internationalized" waterway must have been examined in Karachi with mixed emotions.

Meanwhile, in a polyglot Commonwealth, equality between sovereign units entails racial equality within them. Asia has its own consciousness of color; if aggressors in Korea had been Occidental rather than

Oriental, it might have been less diffident about collective action against them. Over race discrimination both wings of the Commonwealth are at loggerheads with their South African partner. British sea-power—and thus that of the Atlantic Allies—depends on South African ports; it cannot pay the Union (which is to join the West's projected Middle East Command) as it does not pay her Asian opponents, to scrap the Commonwealth bond. Yet it was there that the mistreatment of his migrant kin first provoked Gandhi himself; the further presence of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon in the Commonwealth would be jeopardized if others within it supported the Boers as they defy United Nations trusteeship rules in South West Africa. Elsewhere on the Dark Continent native welfare is uppermost in the British approach to African self-government, social betterment, and Central African federation—and even though India herself still lags in the abolition of caste.

Would an emancipated Africa remove itself from the orbit of the West? The danger of unrest there is not only that it will be exploited by Moscow but that it might add to a world array of colored peoples versus whites. And for the United States, as the leader of the West, leadership against so dire a contingency begins at home. Nor, in the global strategy of the Atlantic allies, is it imperative merely to hold North Africa; contention with Egypt over the Sudan reminds us that British defense in the Middle East is geared to the territorial proximity and natural resources of East Africa and the African hinterland. Everywhere in Africa the stake of the West is immense.

Yet more conspicuous on the American-Commonwealth agenda has been the future of the Pacific area. The Atlantic-Pacific wing of the Commonwealth went along with the United States over the Japanese peace treaty. In her Chinese policy Britain had endeavored to humor India. New Delhi disapproved, however, of the San Francisco pact, and, as one of its sponsors, Downing Street veered again toward Washington. Yet there, too, the lines are blurred. Australia and New Zealand have, like the Philippines, been apprehensive over the American revival of Japan, and, on this vexed question, had clung to Britain. Yet, to sweeten the pill, Washington signed a tripartite security pact with Canberra and Wellington from which London itself was excluded. British interests in southeastern Asia are, of course, still substantial. The American security pacts in the Pacific Zone—with Australia and New Zealand, with the Philippines and with Japan—form a series, however, of an oceanic rather than mainland character. The United States herself may be loath to underwrite Asian remnants of western empire—

though the fall of Hong Kong or the collapse of the French Indo-China would not stop there. The truth is that no adequate, multilateral system of mutual guarantees could be devised for Southeastern Asia from which India abstained. But she would not join one which tried to safeguard colonial interests or, as between East and West, identified India with the West. In Asia, an effectual, all-inclusive equivalent of the North Atlantic Security Pact is therefore not feasible. It would lack any sure fulcrum of regional power for strategic leverage on the spot.

Not that Atlantic capitals are unanimous about Western Europe. Over its defense Anglo-American divergencies are no doubt those of method rather than principle. Yet these, too, can, when serious, harm the objective itself. To the United States it is a premise of world order that Britain maintain her stature as a Great Power. Yet Britain cannot persevere as a Great Power if she discards a network of empire which belongs to her and a Commonwealth partnership to which she herself belongs. This, however, is what she must do so as to merge, as Americans suggest, with a European federal union or fully to adopt that Schuman Plan which should be its solid, coal-steel economic base. Within it Britain would be needed by France as a makeweight against Germanic dynamism; only outside it can Britain sustain a world status which gives her strength in Europe itself. And that will have to be understood if, over the organization of Western Europe, the two chief English-speaking Powers are not to disagree.

Canada in particular, poised as ever between Britain and the United States, would wish no such Anglo-American issue to develop. Though she is both a Pacific and an Atlantic Power, Canada, in her thinking about the prospects of civilization, still deems Europe the more decisive zone. In Korea her anti-Communist forces are the third most numerous; over the naming of China as an aggressor, on the American conduct of the United Nations campaign, she, like Britain and unlike Asian members of the Commonwealth, voted with the United States but expressed qualms to which heed should be paid. For of all peoples the Canadians are closer to the American than any other. If Washington wants a gauge of the impression made by its policies none better than Ottawa can be found. An architect of the Atlantic Alliance, Canada reconciled national independence with Britannic ties through her advocacy of the Commonwealth idea. But friction with the United States had also taught her not to stand alone against an impetuous great neighbor.

Hemispheric in origin, Canada's quest for a far-flung equilibrium may be a clue to a larger cooperative process. To preserve the liberty of the parts

the governance of the United States is through a system of checks and balances. What is formally enshrined in the American Constitution may empirically be attained in the American-Commonwealth relationship—from the same motive and for a similar, common aim.

## Democratic Dilemma

STEPHEN SITEMAN

WHEN a democracy undertakes to defend itself by armed force it finds that it has to surrender temporarily some of those virtues and values which it hopes to protect. It does this, if it is a healthy democracy, grudgingly and, if it is America, organizes a committee at each step.

The right of the conscientious objector to war—a comparative newcomer on the political scene—is a particularly thorny liberty. Rooted in individual conscience, where liberties begin, it blossoms most luxuriantly at the very time when the democracy thinks it should remain demurely unseen.

The issue is never satisfactorily resolved. Perhaps it cannot be. Society, back to the first law of nature, feels it cannot allow an unqualified right to be a conscientious objector. Its trust is still in might. The c.o. is never content; to put up with less, he feels, is a defeat.

Not every nation recognizes, legally, the right of the c.o. American's recognition, while it is in the vanguard of this type of legislation, nevertheless trails such countries as Australia and Great Britain. Its present law, enacted in 1948 and amended since, is not its best.

For a time, the Selective Service Act of 1948 allowed complete exemption to anyone classified as a conscientious objector by his local board. With the beginning of the Korean conflict and the subsequent revision of the draft law, he is now required to put in two years of civilian service of a type as yet unspecified. The average c.o., however, is ready to perform an alternative service of a sacrificial and often a dangerous nature.

But the real stumbling block and the one that is sending many young men, who would otherwise cooperate with the draft law, to prison is the provision that insists all objection must be derived from the individual's "religious training and belief" and then defines this to include an affirmative belief in a supreme being.

In the first years of this act it was possible (as happened at least once in New York City) for a young man, just old enough to be caught up at the end of World War II and classified 4-E (the c.o.

classification), to be just young enough for the 1948 law and be denied a similar classification.

The hearing officer in this case testified in his report to the appeal board that the registrant was of "high moral and ethical standards" with several more laudatory adjectives. He nevertheless said he was forced to recommend a 1-A classification because the registrant's objections were not "essentially religious within the meaning of the Selective Service Act of 1948."

There is considerable legal opinion that this requirement of a belief in a supreme being, before accepting an individual's faith as religious, violates the Bill of Rights, i.e., by limiting religious freedom.

But, barrier as this is, many conscientious objectors, who come to look upon their path as something akin to a steeplechase, might yet find their way through to a 4-E, or 1-O as it is now called. Might, that is, if local boards and appeal boards, hearing officers and sometimes judges acted more from an understanding of "religious training and belief," which nowhere mentions church affiliation, than from the present prejudices. (Judges, of course, do not decide the classification of a registrant. They only sentence. But thirty days is a far cry from five years. And both are within his power to impose and both have been imposed for the same offense at different times by different judges.)

It is really impossible—impossible for anyone without the resources and files of the Selective Service system—to make final judgments about the classification and treatment of conscientious objectors under the draft act. The unofficial committees which handle their cases—the Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors of Philadelphia on the national scene and local ones like the Metropolitan Board for Conscientious Objectors of New York—can examine only those individuals who come to them for help. The National Service Board for Religious Objectors of Washington, D. C., the agency of a large group of religious bodies, is in a somewhat similar position.

Even if one had access to the Selective Service files themselves, it would be a herculean task to analyze, with scholarly standards, the treatment of all those who claimed, at one time or another, classification as a conscientious objector. The reason is that many such individuals receive other classification for physical reasons, for dependents, etc. It would take an examination of almost every registrant to root out all such claimants.

But some trends can be observed. There are, for instance, those registrants who, failing to receive the classification they felt they were entitled to, chose to face a prison sentence, which they duly received, rather than serve in the armed forces.

Before the Korean incident, these sentences averaged fifteen months. This compared to the 30.6 months average for World War II which, in turn, was higher than the average for all other federal convictions. Since the start of fighting in Korea and before truce negotiations were begun, the average for May, 1951 was 33.5 months. Last December, which may not be a typical month, saw four convictions at three years each and one at five.

That month also saw two five year sentences, previously imposed, reduced to three each and one three year sentence reduced to two.

The disparity in sentences lends weight to the suspicion that prejudice is active even on the judicial level. In Boston, one extreme conscientious objector who refused to complete any questionnaire was given a sentence of 90 days while close upon that decision, a New York judge imposed two five year sentences, saying that he wanted these boys to stay in jail at least as long as their military service would have been. (He was referring to the federal provision which says that all individuals, convicted of a federal offense, are eligible for parole consideration at the expiration of one third of their sentences. At this rate, someone with a five year sentence would be eligible for parole after serving 20 months and, since he might not be paroled immediately, would be likely to serve two years. This, however, assumes that he will be paroled. If not, the man with five years will serve more than three of them.)

Subsequently, under the provision that allows a federal judge to reduce a sentence within 60 days after imposing it, this judge reduced these two sentences to three years. However, he gave no indication of abandoning his policy in future cases.

Although New York is heavily beset with prejudiced officials, the prize (though it would take some ingenuity to select this kind of prize) goes to a Kansas judge, who gave one c.o. three sentences of five years each on charges of failing to fill out a questionnaire, failing to report for a physical examination, and refusing to report for induction. Two of the sentences were to run concurrently, making a total, in terms of length of imprisonment, of ten years. This was more severe than any sentence handed down, even at the height of World War II.

Again protest was effective and the sentence was reduced to five years by the expedient of having all three sentences run concurrently.

Back in New York, at least one of the panel of four appeal hearing officers is known to be hostile to the conscientious objector. At first this officer would argue with the young men, brushing aside the explanations of their convictions against military service and war, and refusing to sustain their claim. He took the position that only members of the his-

toric peace churches (Quaker, Mennonite, and Brethren) were entitled to the classification of conscientious objector, and told one Catholic c.o. that it was impossible for a Catholic to be opposed to military service. (Later the courts very properly acquitted this young man of a charge of failing to report for induction, since his appeal for reclassification had not been adequately considered. It was on similar grounds that a Connecticut court dismissed a case when it learned that the state director of Selective Service had ordered the local boards not to classify any men 4-E but to give them all 1-A so that the appeal boards could make all the decisions.)

Hearings before this officer became occasions of such exasperation that the Metropolitan Board for Conscientious Objectors sent a delegation to confer with the Attorney General in Washington. (Hearing officers are Department of Justice appointees rather than Selective Service.) Their memorandum to McGrath recommended (among other things) the appointment of men "who recognize that personal religion, regardless of church affiliation, and no matter how unusual or unpopular these religious beliefs may be, should be acceptable under the Selective Service Act as well as under the Constitution."

The situation is by no means solved, although the hearing officer no longer blusters at the appealing registrants. He does, however, spend more time on the number of war bonds they have (or have not) bought than on their religious attitudes. He confines himself to a few brusque, if routine, questions.

It is easy to conclude that vigilance is the price of a 4-E, now called 1-O, and that, on the whole, our democratic processes, although they may creak a little, are still sound. But these instances are drawn only from those cases which come to the attention of the service agencies. Those who try to minister to themselves may be ground in the mill of Selective Service in silence and obscurity. This is particularly true of those who are seeking some more usual classification than 4-E and so escape even a searching eye.

It may be significant that, as was learned quite by chance, one local board in New York City during World War II had at one point a total of 25 individuals originally file a claim for 4-E. Of this number, only two pursued their claims to a conclusion. What happened to the other 23? And how often is this duplicated in the hundreds of other local boards?

We don't know. We wish we did.

## The World Church: News and Notes

### Methodist Report Asks State Aid for Church Schools

Melbourne (RNS)—State aid for church schools was urged in recommendations made here at a conference of The Methodist Church of Australasia by its commission on education.

In certain circumstances, the commission said, state relief should be given to church schools.

The commission also suggested that parents of children attending church schools should receive a government grant for part of the fees paid. This grant, the commission said, should be four-fifths of the cost that would be incurred by the State for the education of a child in a public school of similar grade.

These proposals had met with opposition in district synod meetings held prior to the conference sessions.

Because of this opposition, and because word had been received that the federal government had announced it was considering making school fees a deductible tax item, the proposals were referred back to the commission for recommendation "in the light of the traditional attitude of The Methodist Church towards this question."

Earlier, W. H. Frederick, head master of Wesley College here, said the conference should support any move for parents of children attending church schools to get some tax relief.

"It would be a pity," he said, "if Wesley became a school only for the sons of families in the higher income groups."

### Yugoslav Organ Accuses Vatican

London (RNS)—*Borba*, official Yugoslav newspaper, has accused the Vatican of helping Italian authorities in the persecution of Yugoslav minorities in Gorizia and Venetia Giulia, the Belgrade Radio reported.

The station quoted *Borba* as saying "this persecution also is pursued in churches with the knowledge of the Vatican. The Slovene language has been prohibited in 40 churches despite the protests of the Venetian Slovenes."

The Yugoslav accusations against the Vatican were made soon after Roman Catholic Bishop Antonio Santin of Trieste had appealed for American help against alleged Yugoslav persecution of Catholics in Zone B of the free territory. Bishop Santin's appeal was made in a message to Francis Cardinal Spellman, Archbishop of New York.

### Form Intercreedal Goodwill Group in Florence

Rome (RNS)—Roman Catholic, Protestant and Jewish citizens of Florence have formed a committee for the promotion of understanding and cooperation among members of the three faiths.

The group is organizing regular public meetings on subjects of common interest to the three faiths. The first lecture was given by Father Dino Barsotti on "Abraham, Our Common Father."

# Christianity and Crisis

A Bi-Weekly Journal of Christian Opinion  
537 West 121st St., New York 27, N. Y.

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A special commission is in charge of the revision of school manuals and Sunday school books with a view to eliminating texts which are likely to cause misunderstanding among the Christians and Jews.

### Polish Regime to Censor Deceased Cardinal's Sermons

London (RNS)—Polish Communist authorities have ordered that all sermons and speeches of the late Adam Cardinal Sapieha, Archbishop of Cracow, must be sub-

mitted for censorship before they can be published in book form or reproduced singly in church publications.

Cardinal Sapieha, who died last July, had a reputation for courageous preaching, and never hesitated to chide the authorities when he felt it necessary. He was particularly known for his forceful manner in guiding the clergy in their duties to the faithful and the church.

The cardinal's sermons are fast becoming an inspiration to those resisting Communist encroachments. Priests, unable to preach freely, have been quoting from the sermons, and some had suggested that they be issued in book form.

### Burma Christian Laywoman Gets Cabinet Post

Rangoon, Burma (RNS)—Mrs. Ba Maung Chain, prominent Karen laywoman and president of the Burma Christian Council and the Burma YWCA, has been named a minister in the Burmese Cabinet. She will be in charge of the Karen State.

Mrs. Chain will represent the Burma YWCA at the International YWCA Conference in Geneva in June. She also will attend the July meeting in Germany of the International Missionary Council as a representative of the Burma Christian Council.

Long active in public and civic affairs, Mrs. Chain is a leader of an interracial group in Burma which consistently worked for peace in the country's civil war. When the fighting was at its worst, she went behind the lines to plead for peace with leaders of the opposing factions.

### British Protest Attack on Seville Protestant Church

London (RNS)—The British Ambassador at Madrid has filed a protest with the Spanish government against damage to a British-owned church in Seville by a group of Spanish youths on March 4.

The protest was disclosed to the House of Commons by Selwyn Lloyd, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, in response to a query from Sir Douglas Savory, Unionist member from North Ireland.

"Her Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid has reported this most regrettable hooliganism and has delivered a note to the Spanish government reserving the right to claim compensation for damage to British property," Mr. Lloyd said.

### Authors in This Issue

Lionel Gelber is the author of THE RISE OF ANGLO-AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP (1938); PEACE BY POWER (1942); and REPRISE FROM WAR (1950).

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We regret to announce the death of Dr. Howard Chandler Robbins on March 20th. Dr. Robbins was one of the founders of Christianity and Crisis.

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